Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Jose Francisco Arroyo v. State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Walter F. Bugden; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Arroyo v. Utah, No. 890128.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2487

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

y.TAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEE

R
.89
SWl
y
DOCKET NO.'.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890128

v.
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Petitioner.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS ON PETITION OF CERTIORARI.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

WALTER F. BUGDEN
227 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
AUG 21989

Attorney for Appellant
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ATI- OF UTAH,
Plaintif f-Respondent,

Cririt;

N- •

I I1) 01 ? 8

v
JOS I FPAN"'] 'h ' ' ' AH Hi 'V'

Category

JNo.

2

Defendant-Petitioner,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM: A DECISION OF THE UTAH
APPEALS ON PETITION OF CERTIORARI.

'OURT OF

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
2 3 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Ui .ill H A I H,
Attorneys for Respondent

WALTER F. BUGDEN
227 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
A f f »r in e Y

f (" 11 A p p e 1 1 a n t

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
POINT II

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON
THE ISSUE OF CONSENT IS CORRECT

4

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING CASE LAW

7

POINT III DEFENDANT WAIVED THE CLAIM THAT THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AFFORDS HIM BROADER PROTECTION
THAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. ALTERNATIVELY,
HIS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED

11

CONCLUSION

23

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

10

Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. App. 1985)

21

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)

21

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)

9

Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928)

20

Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1983)

15

State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P.2d 704 (1923)

20

State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1981)

15

State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah Ct. App.
filed Feb. 15, 1989)

12

State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986)

16-17

State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986)

22

State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982)

17

State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984)

11

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)

14, 16

State v. Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Wis App.
1985)

19

State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)

14, 16

State v. Jesso, 21 Utah 2d, 444 P.2d 517 (1968)

15

State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985)

15

State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986)

15, 18

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986)

16-17

State v. Kreiqbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 P.2d 1061 (1982)

19

State v. LePaqe, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 1057
State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986)
-ii-

21
16-17

State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super 229, 491 A.2d 37
(1985), aff'd, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987)
State v. Quinn, 50 Or. App. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981)
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988)

15-16, 20
17
7

State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987)

18

State v. Wood, 457 So.2d 206 (La. App. 1984)

21, 23

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)

21

Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1986)

22

United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986)

8-10

United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982)

10

United State v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

19, 21-22

United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981)

10

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

9-10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989)

1

Utah Const. Art. I, section 14

11, 17, 19
21, 23

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test; A Flexible Approach
to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1
(1975)

19-21

Bradley, Two models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 1468 (1985)

17

Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention; 1895 319 (1898)

14

Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations; Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule 69 Geo. L.J. 1361
(1981)

19

Stewart, The Road Map to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond; The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1365 (1983)

21-22

-iii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,

:

Case No. 880062-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Petitioner. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals on Petition of Certiorari.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly decide that

defendant conceded the issue of consent?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly decide to

remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
consent where voluntary consent vitiates a prior illegal stop?
3.

Did defendant waive his state constitutional claims

by failing to articulate them to the Utah Court of Appeals?
4.

Should this Court adopt a standard similar to the

federal standard under the state constitution?
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of
a controlled substance, a second degree felony.

Judge Harding

granted defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and the State

filed an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The

Court of Appeals reversed Judge Harding's order granting
suppression.

This Court granted review on Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 15, 1987, Highway Patrol Trooper Paul
Mangelson was driving southbound on Interstate 15 at about 4:00
p.m. when he observed defendant's truck driving northbound near
Nephi (R. 50). Mangelson may have observed that defendant's
truck displayed out of state license plates (R. 50). He did
observe that defendant was following the vehicle in front of him
at a distance of about 3 or 4, possible 5 car lengths and he felt
that distance was unsafe (R. 51).
Mangelson turned through the median and pulled up to
defendant's truck (R. 51, 52). Pulling alongside defendant,
Mangelson estimated defendant's speed at approximately 50 miles
per hour (R. 51).

At that time, Mangelson also observed that

defendant appeared to be Hispanic (R. 52). Because Mangelson
still felt defendant was following too closely, he pulled
defendant over (R. 53).
Mangelson issued a citation to defendant for following
too closely and for driving on an expired driver's license (R.
5).

At some point, defendant consented to Mangelson's subsequent

Judge Harding found that Mangelson estimated the speed at 50
miles per hour even though Mangelson testified that it was 50 to
55 and defendant said he was travelling 54 miles per hour (T.
169, 192, 195).
-2-

search of the truck (R. 53).

Mangelson discovered approximately

one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel.

He

arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance (R.
6).
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over
to District court on the narcotics charge (R. 1-3). Defendant
moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence claiming that
Mangelson's traffic stop was pretextual for an investigative
search of defendant's truck (R. 12-13).

Judge Harding granted

the motion to suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and an Order suppressing the evidence on January 6, 1988
(R. 49-55).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the
record supports a finding that defendant conceded the issue of
consent.

Defendant never argued that his consent was coerced and

he prepared a specific finding of fact that he did consent to the
search.
Given that defendant consented to the search, the prior
illegality of the stop is vitiated in this case.

There is no

evidence of coercion of defendant's consent in the record.
Defendant's claims to the contrary are mostly based upon a "but
for" casual connection that has been rejected by the Tenth
Circuit and the United State Supreme Court.

Defendant conceded that he consented to the search, therefore,
no details were presented after the facts surrounding the initial
stop. Defendant challenged only the initial stop (R. 53, T.
189).
-3-

Defendant waived his opportunity to raise an analysis
of the Utah Constitution in the Court of Appeals and should not
be allowed to make his analysis for the first time in this Court.
Even if this Court does reach the state constitutional argument,
it need not suppress the evidence.

A consent search is a

reasonable search and should vitiate any prior illegality of the
stop.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE
ISSUE OF CONSENT IS CORRECT.
Defendant contends that the Utah Court of Appeals erred
in its conclusion that the lower court found that defendant
consented to the search of his vehicle.

Specifically, he

complains that his attorney never used the word "stipulate" and
that the appellate court's opinion is in error because it states
that counsel stipulated.

Careful review of the trial court

record and of the appellate court's opinion, however, supports a
conclusion that defendant, in effect, stipulated that the search
was consensual and that, given the lack of any claim of
involuntariness, the consent was voluntary.
Defendant correctly admits that the State attempted to
present evidence on the issue of voluntary consent and that
defense counsel objected claiming that the motion to suppress
only addressed the validity of the stop.

The trial court then

limited the State to evidence concerning the stop.

See T. 189.

Defendant insists, nevertheless, that he did not "stipulate" that
the search was conducted upon his consent.
-4-

He urges this Court

to do what the Court of Appeals would not do.

That is to remand

this case for a hearing to determine that his consent was
voluntary.

This result, however, would reward defendant for

misdirecting the trial court in the first instance and allow him
to raise a claim at this late date that he studiously avoided in
the appropriate stage of the proceeding and overlooks the factual
finding already entered by the trial court.
Without ever claiming that his consent to search was
not voluntarily given, defendant effectively prevented the State
from presenting evidence on the issue.

If defendant had stopped

there, perhaps his argument on appeal would be well taken.
did not, however, stop there.

He

Defense counsel prepared Findings

of Fact for the trial court in which he included the following:
18. The Trooper requested permission to
search the Defendant's vehicle, and the
Defendant consented to the search of the
vehicle.
(R. 53) (emphasis added).

On appeal, defendant attempted to

convince the Court of Appeals that this finding does not mean
what it says.

He claimed that the trial court made no finding of

voluntariness of the consent.

The Court of Appeals rejected this

argument and this Court should also reject it.

The finding of

the trial court cannot be limited in the manner that defendant
wishes to limit it.
consent occurred.

Defendant, in effect, conceded that the

Without so much as a hint that he did not

consent voluntarily, he prepared a specific finding that he did
consent to the search of the vehicle.

This finding should be

read, as the Court of Appeals read it, to include by implication

•5-

the logical extension of its express terms that the consent was
voluntarily given.

This is a logical conclusion for the Court of

Appeals to reach because if defendant had argued at trial that
his consent was involuntary, he would be arguing that it was not
a consent search.

Where, on the other hand, defendant prepared a

finding of fact stating that he consented, the state, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals could rightfully conclude that
defendant conceded the issue.
Defendant asserts that the decision of the Court of
Appeals "occurred because of a blurring or imprecise use of the
word 'consent'."
imprecise.

App. Br. at 8.

The record is not blurred or

It plainly supports the Court of Appeals' decision

that defendant conceded the issue of consent.
Defendant argues further that the trial court made no
conclusions of law about the issue of consent, therefore, the
Court of Appeals is incorrect in concluding that the finding of
fact on the issue controls.
unfounded.

This argument is unsupported and

The trial court made no findings on this issue

because defense counsel was convinced, and convinced the court,
that the fact of consent was irrelevant where the stop itself was
unlawful.

Thus, that the trial court did not enter any

conclusions of law on the issue is the result of misapplication
of the law, not of lack of support for the conclusion.

Defendant

appears to assert that his concession of consent should not be
enforced because there was no evidence presented on the issue.
Litigants often stipulate, waive, or concede issues without the
benefit of record evidence upon which later observers can
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determine the reason for their actions and courts should not
allow a litigant's remorse over the concession to control whether
the litigant will be held to the concession.
It is understandable that defendant now regrets his
concession because he recognizes his error in believing that an
illegal stop always invalidates a subsequent consent search under
the federal constitution.

The Court of Appeals correctly relied

upon the express findings entered by the trial court rather than
upon defendant's later claims that he did not intend to close the
door on other avenues of attacking the search.

This Court should

also find that defendant conceded the issue of consent.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT
WITH EXISTING CASE LAW.
Defendant asserts that his case is "not unlike" that of
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988).

Contrary to

defendant's assertion, this case is not like Sierra.

Because

this case is distinguishable from Sierra, the Court of Appeals
appropriately refused to remand for an evidentiary hearing.
In Sierra, the court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of consent because there was no evidence in
the record on the issue of voluntariness.

In that case, unlike

this case, the trial court did not enter a finding of fact that
the defendant consented to the search.

The appellate court

remanded Sierra because the police officer had testified that
Sierra volunteered to let him search, however, the trial court
had not made any findings on the issue whatsoever nor had Sierra
conceded the issue of consent.

There was also testimony that the
7-

drugs were found in another location after an extensive search of
the interior and other areas of the car.

From the record, the

Court of Appeals also noted that Sierra did not appear to speak
English well and perhaps could not understand the officer.

Thus,

questions of fact remained as to whether Sierra had consented to
the portion of the search that revealed the contraband.
In this case, the trial court specifically found that
defendant consented to the search.

It was, thus, unnecessary to

remand for an evidentiary hearing even though the record does not
contain evidence of what defendant said or exactly where the
officer searched.

Here, defendant conceded the issue regardless

of whether this Court is able to determine the exact facts upon
which he based the concession.
Defendant's concession should be interpreted to include
all aspects of the term "consent."

The Court of Appeals simply

determined that when defendant used that term, he was conceding
that the consent was voluntary.

This determination makes further

factual development unnecessary since voluntary consent is itself
an intervening act "sufficiently distinguishable from the primary
illegality to purge the evidence of the primary taint."

United

States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986).

For this reason, defendant is

incorrect in asserting that this Court must remand for a hearing
to determine if the consent attenuated the taint of the illegal
8 top.
In point III of his brief, defendant argues that the
Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent with case law analyzing
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the Fourth Amendment.

He urges this court to read Carson more

narrowly than did the Court of Appeals because he claims that
voluntary consent to search is not of itself sufficient to
overcome an initially unconstitutional stop.

Defendant ignores

that the Tenth Circuit expressly stated that voluntary consent is
of itself an intervening act that vitiates the initial illegality
of the stop.

793 F.2d at 1147-48. Where the fruits of the

primary illegality (a pretext stop) are not used to coerce a
defendant into granting consent, then the consent is voluntary
and the illegal stop is irrelevant.
Defendant also ignores Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) in which the United States Supreme Court stated:
The state of mind of the police is irrelevant
to the question of the intelligence and
voluntariness of [defendant's] election to
abandon his rights.
106 S. Ct. at 1141-42. Thus, the focus in a consent search case
is the defendant's grant of consent, not the request to search or
the reasons underlying it.

This concept is consistent with Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) wherein the Court
stated:
We need not hold that all evidence is
" fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because
it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint."
371 U.S. at 487-88 (citation omitted).

Where there is no

evidence of coercion, defendant's voluntary consent is
-9-

sufficiently distinguishable from the pretext stop in this case
to overcome the need for suppression of the evidence.
Defendant cites Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)
to support his claim that a consent search is always invalidated
by an illegal detention.

Royer is distinguishable and more

narrow than defendant asserts.

The officers in Royer were found

to have exceeded the bounds of a permissible stop by engaging in
activities that coerced defendant into granting his consent to
search.

The officers retained Royer's airline ticket and

identification while they requested him to accompany them to a
small room for questioning.

They obtained Royer's luggage

without his permission and then asked to search it. While Royer
did not object to the search, he merely acquiesced to a coercive
show of authority.

The Court found that such acquiescence was

not a valid consent.

It is likely that, faced with other facts,

the Supreme Court would find the consent valid.
There have been no facts established in this case that
indicate defendant was coerced into granting his consent.

Absent

such facts, the decision of the Court of Appeals is appropriate.
Defendant also cites cases from other circuit courts of
appeal that are contrary to Carson.

These cases, however, merely

adopt the Mbut for" causal connection that Carson rejects.

See

United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982), and United
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981).

Carson contains

the much more workable analysis of the Wong Sun standard.

The

Tenth Circuit's analysis should be adopted by his Court on the
issue of defendant's federal constitutional claim.

•10-

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE CLAIM THAT THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AFFORDS HIM BROADER PROTECTION
THAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. ALTERNATIVELY,
HIS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED.
In the Utah Court of Appeals, defendant contended that
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords broader
protection to citizens than does the United States Constitution.
As the Court of Appeals noted, however, defendant did not
articulate what these broader protections are or what is their
basis.

For this reason, the Court of Appeals refused to reach

the issue.

This Court should also refuse to reach the issue

where defendant failed to make his argument in the court from
which he appeals.

£f.

State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984)

(defendant must have specifically stated to the trial court the
same grounds for objection to evidence he presents on appeal).
Alternatively, if this Court reaches the state
constitutional claim it should decline defendant's invitation to
expand Article I, section 14 in the manner suggested.

That

section provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
This language does not mandate suppression of the evidence in
this case and, in fact, supports its admission.

By obtaining

defendant's consent to search his vehicle, the officer avoided
violating defendant's right to be secure in his effects because a
consent search is a reasonable search.
-11-

On the other hand, defendant argues that because the
initial stop was unreasonable, this Court should hold that a
subsequent consent to search is always ineffective.

On its face,

defendant's claim that his analysis provides a bright line rule
is inviting.

He argues that officers will avoid stopping

vehicles unreasonably if the lure of obtaining a later consent to
search is unavailable.
On closer inspection, this rule would not provide a
bright line to officers at the stage where a bright line would
actually simplify search and seizure rules.

It is unrealistic to

focus on what occurs after the stop when it is the initial
decision whether to make the stop that creates the most confusion
for an officer.
In this case, the lower courts held that the officer's
decision to stop defendant was pretextual.

Although the Court of

Appeals acknowledged that the officer's own reasons for making
the stop were irrelevant to its holding, it held that an
objectively reasonable officer would not have stopped defendant
under the circumstances.

State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,

35 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 15, 1989).

The court concluded that

the officer would not have stopped defendant "except for some
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." Id.
Conversely, the officer must have thought the stop was reasonable
since he actually issued a citation for the offense he claimed he
observed.

It is very difficult indeed for officers to determine

whether they are making an -objectively reasonable" stop for
legitimate reasons when they also harbor some suspicions of other
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activities about the subject.

A rule requiring suppression of

evidence obtained after a consent search occurring after an
unreasonable stop will not make the decision whether to stop an
individual easier for the officer in the field.

It is a fact of

human frailty that officers will continue to make stops based
upon a mistaken judgment of legitimacy regardless of whether
permission to search may later be sought.
It is actually much more realistic for this Court to
focus upon the fact of defendant's consent in this case and find
that a consent search does not violate the right to be free from
unreasonable searches.

It is unlikely that officers would waste

their time stopping individuals they have absolutely no reason to
stop merely to ask if they can search the vehicle as defendant
warns.

It is more likely that the desire to investigate other

suspicions clouds an officer's ability to make an objective
decision whether to stop.

He or she may have difficulty deciding

in that situation whether the observed driving pattern is the
reason for the stop or whether their suspicions are controlling.
For these reasons, a rule of state law that suppresses evidence
in a case such as this one is unhelpful and this Court would
better utilize its time finding ways to make the decision to stop
or not an easier one to make for officers in the field.
The State is aware that several of this Court's recent
opinions have suggested that, as has been done in some other
states with their constitutions' search-and-seizure provisions,
Article I, section 14 could be construed to expand constitutional
protection beyond that mandated by the United State Supreme Court
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under the fourth amendment.

State v. Earl# 716 P.2d 803, 805-06

(Utah 1986); State v. Hyqh# 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring separately).

This Court could also

independently analyze the state provision and conclude that,
3
given its similarity to the Fourth Amendment,
the Federal
analysis is well taken and adopt a similar analysis for the Utah
Constitution.

However, the State recognizes that the current

Court may still give the state provision an independent and more
protective interpretation in future cases, perhaps adopting the
following view taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in a recent
case:
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the
utmost respect in its interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution. We must, however, reserve
for this Court the sole and absolute right to
make the final interpretation of our state
Constitution and, while of great persuasion,
we will not concede that simply because the
U.S. Supreme Court may interpret a U.S.
Constitution provision that we must fie the
same interpretation to essentially the same
words in a provision of our state
Constitution.

The State has been able to find only a brief reference to
Article I, section 14 at the Constututional Convention of 1895.
The following appears to be the entire record of any proceedings
in that regard:
The Chariman: Gentlemen, we will take up
section 14,
Section 14 was read and passed without
amendment.
Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention:
1895, 319 (1989). The development of Utah's search-and-seizure
provision prior to the adoption of article I, section 14 reflects
a steady movement by the drafters toward adoption of the precise
wording of the fourth amendment.
-14-

Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983).

See also State

v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986); State
v. Arrinqton, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1981).
Nevertheless, the State urges the Court not to lose sight of its
history of construing Article I, section 14 as providing the same
scope of protection as the fourth amendment, and the philosophy
underlying that history.

See e.g., State v. Jesso, 21 Utah 2d,

444 P.2d 517 (1968); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976).
It should proceed very cautiously into this new territory.

As

the Vermont Supreme Court correctly stated:
The development of state constitutional
jurisprudence will call for the exercise of
great judicial responsibility as well as
diligence from the trial bar. It would be a
serious mistake for this Court to use its
state constitution chiefly to evade the
impact of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Our decisions must be
principled, not result-oriented. Justice
Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court
expressed his concern this way: "[s]tate
courts should not look to their constitutions
only when they wish to reach a result
different from the United States Supreme
Court. That practice runs the risk of
criticism as being more pragmatic than
principled."
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Vt. 1985) (footnote
citation omitted).

A recent opinion from the New Jersey courts

echoes this concern:
There are certain dangers inherent in state
courts relying too heavily on state
Constitutions to afford greater protection to
its citizens. The erosion of national
constitutional doctrine is one illustration.
We are therefore mindful of the desirability
of uniformity between the state and federal
courts in the interpretation of parallel
constitutional provisions. Divergent
interpretations should be avoided unless
-15-

guidelines such as those discussed in State
v. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 358-368, 450 A.2d 952,
justify a departure.
State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 239-40, 491 A.2d 37, 43
(1985), aff'd, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).

In the Hunt

case cited by the Novembrino court, Justice Handler in a
concurring opinion identified the following criteria for deciding
whether to interpret the state constitution differently than has
the federal constitution:

(1) textual language; (2) legislative

history; (3) preexisting state law; (4) structural differences;
(5) matters of particular state interest or local concern; (6)
state traditions, and (7) public attitudes.

This would be a

reasonable set of factors for this Court to take into account
before resorting to independent state constitutional
interpretation to provide protections that are either less
expansive or nonexistent under federal constitution.
It is highly significant that, even after the issuance
of the "suggestive" opinions in Earl and Hygh, the Court
continues to rely solely on federal precedent interpreting the
fourth amendment in deciding search-and-seizure issues, with no
indication that those issues might be decided differently under
Article I section 14 or that additional briefing on the state
constitutional question was necessary.

See, e.g., State v.

Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); State v. Kelly, 718
P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986).

Cf. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188

(Utah 1986) (noting that Hwhat the appropriate remedy might be if
[the defendant] had argued that the officer's action violated his
rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is an

-16-

open question").

This is not to say that the federal precedents

in this area must necessarily represent the most satisfactory
resolution of the issues in all instances, or that alternative
approaches to search and seizure law should never be considered.
See Bradley, "Two models of the Fourth Amendment," 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 1468 (1985)

The point is that this Court will often find

an acceptable resolution of a search or seizure problem in the
federal case law (on both philosophical and public policy
grounds), as it apparently did in Banks and Kelly, and therefore
have no reason to interpret Article I, section 14 differently.
See, e.g., State v. Quinn, 50 Or. App. 383, 623 P.2d 630, 638-9
(1981) (adopting federal position for purposes of state
constitution on search-and-seizure issues); State v. Caraher, 293
Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 948 (1982) (citing cases where the state
court recognized the possibility of expanding protection under
the state constitution beyond that required under the federal
constitution, but declined to take such a step in the given
case).
Defendant also suggests that officers be instructed to
tell people that they are not required to permit a search.
suggestion also sounds good at first blush.
has difficulties in application.

This

It, nevertheless,

Officers frequently ask for

4
Professor Bradley, in an excellent article, discusses two
alternative models for clarification of fourth amendment law. He
argues that adoption of either model would solve many of the
problems the Supreme Court has had with search-and-seizure issues
and would change a widely held view that "[t]he fourth amendment
is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and
obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that
every effort to extract themselves only finds them more
profoundly stuck." 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1468.
-17-

permission to search even where the search may be sustainable on
probable cause, or even where there is a search warrant.
e.g. State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Utah 1987).

See

If

officers in such a situation inform the suspect there is no need
to allow the search, the other bases for the search are undercut
or must be articulated to the individual.

This would require

police officers to be legal scholars and inform a person that
they do not need to permit a search but that the officer is going
to search anyway based upon a warrant, and/or probable cause,
and/or exigent circumstances, etc.

Officers would be effectively

precluded from using the consent search as a back up basis for a
search.

Such an approach is impractical and unworkable.
Finally, defendant merely assumes that if any of his

state constitutional arguments are adopted by this Court,
suppression will result.

This Court need not, however, choose

suppression to remedy a state constitutional violation.

Instead,

this Court could adopt some other remedy it deems appropriate,
such as civil liability, to discourage violations rather than
mandating the frustration of prosecution where the evidence
suppressed is the crucial evidence of criminal activity
suppression of which will result in dismissal of the case.

The

State urges this Court to consider alternatives other than
suppression under the Utah Constitution if it finds that
defendant's separate state constitutional rights were violated.
Three major rationales for the exclusionary rule in
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and legal
literature:

(1) the remedial or personal right rationale; (2)

-18-
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e x c l u s i o n of

in I he

evidence

would be required for a violation of the provision, this Court
should again reject the remedial or personal right rationale as a
constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, as it did, for
all practical purposes, in State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P.2d
704, 706 — 08 (1923).
The theory that exclusion is necessary to preserve
judicial integrity has also received much criticism and has
generally played only a minor role in the development of the
exclusionary rule. Coe, supra at 17. The notion underlying this
theory was perhaps best articulated in the dissent of Justice
Brandels in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandels, J., dissenting):
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. . . . If the
Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself, it invites
anarchy.
In that same case, Justice Holmes wrote in his dissenting
opinion:
We have to choose, and for my part I think it
less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an
ignoble part.
277 U.S. at 470.
Although some courts continue to recognize the judicial
integrity rationale as the most compelling justification for the
exclusionary rule, see, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J.
Super, at 244, 491 A.2d at 45, it is subject to the same attack
as in the personal right rationale—i.e., there appears to be no
constitutional basis for it, either textually or historically.
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Leon decision and a number of state court opinions e.g., State v.
Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986); Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d
837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring), reflect the
majority, and probably better reasoned, view that the deterrence
rationale, like the other rationales, has no readily discernible
basis in the federal constitution or the state constitutions.

On

the other hand, Justice Potter Stewart has articulated what is
perhaps the most compelling counterargument to that view:
To give effect to the Constitution's
prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures, it may be necessary for the
judiciary to remove the incentive for
violating it. Thus, it may be argued that
although the Constitution does not explicitly
provide for exclusion, the need to enforce
the Constitution's limits on government—to
preserve the rule of law-requires an
exclusionary rule. Under this third
"doctrinal" basis for the exclusionary rule,
which has been described as "constitutional
common law," the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is not a
constitutional right but a constitutional
remedy. It is a right only in the sense that
every remedy vests a right in those who may
claim it.
Stewart, supra at 1384.

But even he qualified his argument by

stating:
Under such an approach, the determination
whether the exclusionary rule is
constitutionally required turns on whether
there are other adequate remedies available
to ensure that the government does not
violate the fourth amendment at its pleasure.
Id.
Assuming that this Court is among those courts that see
deterrence of police misconduct as the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule, the Court should explicitly hold that an
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